C.S. Lewis -- Mere Christianity Book I

1. Last week the C.S. Lewis class/webinar began at Houghton College. Last week we read Lewis' autobiography, Surprised by Joy and his sermon, "Weight of Glory." The argument for God in these works was described as an "argument from desire."

I might note that, in Surprised by Joy, Lewis mentions that the Joy argument was one that featured on his path to Christianity but was not one that particularly continued beyond that phase. The basic argument, it seems, is that the longing for Joy, without being able to attain it in this life, is an indication of the existence of glory/joy beyond this life.

This argument felt vaguely Platonic to me. It reminded me of the ontological argument for the existence of God. A little research reassured me that I was not entirely crazy. Last year I bought Michael Peterson's C.S. Lewis and the Christian Worldview to give me a more systematic perspective on Lewis' philosophy. Sure enough, Lewis is sometimes considered a "Christian Platonist" (9), and in The Last Battle Professor Digory tells Lucy, "It's all in Plato, all in Plato" (11-12). 

2. I suppose this all partially explains why Lewis has never spoken to me. I feel a little bad about this fact because so many of my friends absolutely love him. And I note that Francis Collins basically came to faith on Lewis' moral argument, as he says in The Language of God.

Mere Christianity is the one work of Lewis that I read either in college or seminary. I had difficulty understanding it at the time. I wonder in part if it's because I just don't think like Lewis. At that stage of my life, I was much more Aristotelian I would say than Platonic. I had much more of a scientific mind than a idealist one. 

It was clear in Surprised by Joy that Lewis came to faith through idealism. He became first convinced that realism is wrong, that truth is to be found in a sense of an absolute ideal. Hegel, then Bergson's elan vital, then God. This is a path completely foreign to me. 

Bergson shows up at the end of chapter 4 in Book I. He mentions the sense of a life-force as an in-between stage. We know from Surprised that these comments were autobiographical. "One reason why many people find Creative Evolution so attractive is that it gives one much of the emotional comfort of believing in God and none of the less pleasant consequences" (31-32). [1]

3. The argument in Book I goes as follows:

• "Human beings, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way" and "they do not behave that way" (18). Lewis calls this the "Law of Human Nature."
• Explanations of this common sense are not explained as a herd instinct (19) or a social convention (21).
• This must be a real thing, "a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves" (27). This is the Platonic move.
• A materialist view does not explain this thing. Only a "religious view" does. There is a direction to this moral law within us. It indicates purpose. We would expect something akin to a mind to be behind it. 
• This is somewhat disconcerting to us. We are aware of this standard over us that we cannot meet. "If God is like the Moral Law, then He is not soft" (34).

4. In my early years, I found the cosmological argument the most convincing argument for God, like a good Thomist/Aristotelian. "Nothing comes from nothing." Currently, I find the "fine-tuning argument" most convincing, a form of the argument from design. The only other alternative I see is a multiverse.

But I've never found the ontological or moral argument persuasive. "If I can conceive of a greatest possible Being it must exist." "If all humanity has an innate sense of right and wrong it must exist."

As I implied in my critique of "Weight of Glory," one has a sense that Lewis was not fully conscious (aware, yes, but it didn't sink in) of the extent of human cultural diversity. I will read The Abolition of Man after this course is over, where I think he addresses this question more extensively. But I think I see peek through his argument twentieth century British sensibilities, even "white" sensibilities, even his personality. [2] 

Although it is often responded that Lewis was not speaking to a specific common moral sense (rather the fact of a moral sense itself), this is not really what he says in Mere Christianity here. He gives specifics to right conduct as he understands it--"fair play, unselfishness, courage, good faith, honesty and truthfulness" (34). I thought of the Spartans and Dobu who taught their children to steal. I thought of Ayn Rand and the "virtue" of selfishness. 

I'm not sure that a lot of people today feel even the slightest twinge of guilt when they don't "do to others as you would have them do to you." As a former car salesman once told me glibly with a smile, "If a sucker comes in, I'm going to make some money." The idea that everyone has a conscience, a little voice telling them when they do wrong, seems very much a feature of British and certain strands of European culture to me in its formulation.

5. Chapter 5 of Book I also explained another feature of Lewis I thought I had observed. There can ironically be a certain moral "coldness" to Lewis. Indeed, I think I have observed a certain "duty-based" ethical orientation in some of those who find Lewis' thought most attractive. This is the attitude that relishes for just a second that the Prodigal has gotten what he deserved and makes sure he has thought through and learned his moral lesson before he's allowed to step back into the village.

In short, it seems to me that there is a moral legalism to Lewis. Before God was a person to Lewis, he was a moral absolute. In that sense, the flavor of God in Lewis seems a little skewed to me. God is a measuring rod before God is a person. Romans 3:23 for Lewis is "all have sinned because they have fallen short of God's absolute standard." I think its actual meaning was "all have sinned and thus are lacking the honor God intended for them." 

A revealing comment is when Lewis sees justice as a balancing force to love. "You might think love of humanity in general was safe, but it is not. If you leave out justice..." (21). In my theology, justice is a subcategory of God's love. If I am right that he pits them against each other here, it is a significant defect in his theology, in my opinion. It contributes to a certain moral coldness that I think I have sometimes observed in some who love Lewis.

I hear a Reformed Anglicanism lurking here, not unlike a friend I had in England who was an Anglican priest at the time. He was concerned that I didn't feel my own vileness enough. It seems to me there is a bit of the penal substitution of the Middle Ages lurking here--Anselm, another Platonist.

But what am I to say? I am thankful that many have come to Christ through Lewis. He was clearly brilliant. I am nothing. I will continue to open myself up to his critique.

[1] My page numbers correspond to The C. S. Lewis Signature Classics.

[2] He mentions in Surprised that he just couldn't accept a philosophy where morality wasn't innate. That's not a philosophical argument but a personal one.